Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustments: Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox by Delbono, Flavio & Lambertini, Luca
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal Mergers with Capital 
Adjustment: Workers’ Cooperatives 
and the Merger Paradox 
 
 
Flavio Delbono 
Luca Lambertini 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°962 
 
 
 
Horizontal Mergers with Capital
Adjustment: WorkersCooperatives
and the Merger Paradox
Flavio Delbono# and Luca Lambertinix
# Department of Economics, University of Bologna
Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy; avio.delbono@unibo.it
§ Department of Economics, University of Bologna
Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy; luca.lambertini@unibo.it
September 10, 2014
Abstract
We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among rms
when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. We focus on is
workerscooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment-
constrained prot maximisers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we
prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately
e¢ cient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially e¢ cient if
market size is large enough, even in the case of merger to monopoly.
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1 Introduction
We investigate the consequences of horizontal mergers among rms when the
strategic variable is capital. Firms which most seemingly t such a setting are
workersrms: being owned and managed by workers, their concern about
employment stability is likely to be stronger than in other types of rms.
Actually, this is what the by now large empirical evidence seems to suggest.1
Co-ops play a signicant economic role in their communities. A few facts
listed in the website of the International Co-op Alliance su¢ ce to convey the
dimension of the phenomenon. The co-operative movement brings together
over one billion people around the world. Moreover, co-ops are signicant
players in many national economies. In terms of employment, co-ops provide
over a hundred million jobs over the planet (twenty per cent more than
multinationals). Both in Italy and in France, they employ in 2005 nearly
one million people; in Spain they provide about 250,000 overall jobs in 2012.
Almost the same number of employees worked in 2010 in the 5,450 British co-
ops (10% of which were workerscooperatives). In the US, thirty thousand co-
ops provide more than one million jobs in 2006. The sectorial breakdown of
co-ops varies very much across countries, although, unsurprisingly, the co-ops
with more members operate in the consumer retail market, where members
are the consumers. However, a glance to national gures suggests that the
co-operative presence is often signicant in the credit market, agriculture and
food, housing and construction, health.
In recent years, we are witnessing a resurgence of interest in the co-
operative experiences also because co-ops seem to perform better than con-
ventional rms during slums.2 If we conne our attention to workersco-
1See, for instance, the updated and comprehensive survey by Perotin (2012).
2According to Cecop (the largest European association of national co-ops), co-ops are
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operatives,3 we may observe that the mutuality operating among co-ops helps
them limit the number of bankruptcies as compared to conventional rms in
turmoil. Such help takes sometimes the strong form of merging: for instance,
30 mergers among Italian production co-ops occurred in 2009 against 47 in
the all period 2005-2008.
The rough evidence reported in the next pages suggests that horizontal
merging is a fairly frequent strategy undertaken by co-ops managers, espe-
cially in periods of poor macroeconomic performance. Notwithstanding the
relevance and the frequency of such corporate strategies, to the best of our
knowledge there is no formal attempt to model the consequences of horizon-
tal mergers among co-ops. Our paper aims at lling the gap through a simple
analysis of an oligopoly formed by workersco-ops.
Furthermore, we shall see that, since Ward (1958), the standard objec-
tive function of a workersco-op (revenue net of xed cost divided by the
number of members) coincides with prots when labor is kept constant and
capital is the only variable input, as originally pointed out by Sertel (1987).
Hence, while we focus on horizontal mergers among workersco-ops, our con-
clusions also extend to prot-maximising rms constrained by a given level
of employment. Our results can then participate in the long-lasting debate
a¤ording the ongoing crisis better than non-co-ops, especially as far as employment is
concerned. See Delbono and Reggiani (2013) for a descriptive statistics of some Italian
industries and the references to other European recent experiences.
3Workers co-operatives are rms owned and managed by their employees. This is
a broad denition based on cooperative principles. In a workersco-op the bulk of the
capital is owned (individually or collectively) by employees; all of them are eligible for
membership; a majority of the workers are members; each member has one vote. Again,
see Perotin (2012). Workersco-ops are sometimes called productionco-ops or laborco-
ops, or labor-managed rms, to stress the contribution of labor directly given by members.
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on the merger paradox, according to which the merger is protable for the
merging rms only if they represent a large majority of the overall rms in
the industry.4
We show that:
 The horizontal merger is privately e¢ cient for any merger size. This
holds for insiders and outsiders as well.
 The horizontal merger is socially e¢ cient if market size is large enough,
also in the extreme case of merging to monopoly.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Next section briey
illustrates a sample of episodes of horizontal mergers as corporate strategies
of workersco-operatives in various countries. Section 3 presents the model.
Sections 4 characterises the private incentive to carry out the merger. Section
5 performs the analysis of social e¢ ciency of such a merger. The equivalence
between the behaviour of a workers co-operative and a prot-maximising
rm when the post-merger adjustment operates on the capital side of the
production function is shown in section 6. Section 7 illustrates the possibility
of a socially e¢ cient merger to monopoly. Section 8 concludes.
2 Mergers among co-ops
Horizontal mergers among workersco-ops do not occur only in downturn, as
one can be tempted to believe by looking at the recent waves of mergers in
the co-op movement. We may cite several examples during the 1980s in the
4This debate dates back to Salant et al. (1983). In a linear Cournot model, they show
that a horizontal merger (without cost benets) is protable only if involving at least 80%
of the existing rms.
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US agricultural market: FS Services and Illinois grain cooperative forming
Growmark Inc. Cooperative; Midland Cooperatives and Land OLakes Inc.;
Ohio Farmers Grain and Supply and Landmark Inc. The Rural Business-
Cooperative Service, an agency of USDA Rural Development, counted 367
merger/consolidation events in the period 1993-1997, most of which occurred
in the Corn Belt and Southern Plains regions.5
The dairy industry is another sector featuring a high cooperative density
in which horizontal mergers occur fairly often. A recent example is the
one between Dairylea and DFA, two leading co-ops in the US dairy market.
Another one is the merger in 2009 between Friesland Foods and Campina,
two major Dutch dairy co-operatives, resulting in a combined market share
between 70 and 80% of the market for the procurement of raw milk in the
Netherlands. Again, two Irish leading farmer-owned dairy and agri co-ops
(Ballyclough and Mitchelstown) merged in 1990 giving rise to Dairygold Co-
operative Society.6
Several examples come also from Italy. A merger between two leading
co-ops (Consorzio Colli Berici and Cantina di Colognola ai Colli) created in
2007 a new co-op holding more than 2% of overall Italian wine production.
The Italian constructions industry has witnessed two important horizontal
mergers between CCC and Consorzio Ravennate delle Coooperative di Pro-
5For statistical details of this tide of mergers, see the report by An-
thony Crooks, Consolidation in the heartland, which is available online
(www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/nov00/heart.htm),
6To be precise, the examples coming from the dairy market and often from the agricul-
tural market do not t exactly the denition of workersco-op, as members give products
and not labor to the co-op they belong to. However, tehre is an obvious direct relationship
between the labor employed by a member and the amount of product given by her to the
co-op.
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duzione e Lavoro in 2011, and the one between two bigs of the sector (Unieco
and Coopsette) in 2014.
To continue with other examples, we witness also a wave of mergers of
agrifood cooperatives in Spain (see Meliá et al., 2010).
3 The model
We consider an industry formed by a nite set N = 1; 2; 3:::; n of workers
co-ops. The demand side is summarised by the function
p = a Q (1)
where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi is aggregate output, qi is individual output, p is price and
a is a positive parameter. Production takes place according to the following
technology:
qi = l
p
ki (2)
where l  2 is the constant number of workers/members in each rm, and
ki > 0 denotes the amount of capital installed in rm i. We focus on pure
co-ops in which all workers are also members and conversely.7 According
to a well established tradition in the literature, we model rm is objective
function as value added per worker/member:
Vi =
pqi   ki
l
=

a  lpki   l
P
j 6=i
p
kj

l
p
ki   ki
l
(3)
7This is not an unreasonable assumption. For instance, the average membership ratio
(number of members out of the number of workers) in Italian workersco-ops is about 0.75
(cf. Zanotti, 2012). Italy is the country with the highest number of workersco-ops in the
world (more than 30,000 in 2008, according to Zanotti, 2012).
6
We shall follow Sertel (1987) in keeping membership constant8 (and, for
simplicity, identical across rms) so that the only variable input is capital;
ki is then the strategic variable in the non-cooperative game we are about to
describe.
Although we are modelling a game in the space of capital amounts, this
is equivalent to a standard Cournot-Nash game in output levels. To see this,
note that (2) is invertible, and therefore it can be rewritten as
ki =
q2i
l2
(4)
in such a way that the objective function (3) rewrites as:
Vi =
pqi   ki
l
=
qi
h
l2

a  qi  
P
j 6=i qj

  qi
i
l3
(5)
Coming back to our formulation (3), the status quo ante is then the Nash
equilibrium in the space of capital levels. The rst order condition (FOC) of
rm i is:
@Vi
@ki
=
l

a  lPj 6=ipkj  2 (1 + l2)pki
2l
p
ki
= 0 (6)
Imposing the symmetry condition kj = ki = k on (6) and solving w.r.t. k,
we get the expression of the Nash equilibrium level of capital:
kN (n) =
a2l2
[2 + l2 (n+ 1)]2
(7)
where superscript N mnemonics for Nash equilibrium.9 The resulting value
8 l may be decomposed as follows. If L is the number of workers (coinciding with the
number of members) in a rm and ` is the number of hours worked per person in the same
rm, then l = L`: Since we take l as exogenously given, this is immaterial.
9In correspondence of kN (n) ; the second order condition is always met as
@2Vi
@k2i
=  
 
1 + l2
 
2 + l2 (n+ 1)
2
2a2l3
< 0
everywhere.
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added at equilibrium is:
V N (n) =
a2 (1 + l3)
[2 + l2 (n+ 1)]2
(8)
and the associated equilibrium price is
pN (n) =
a (2 + l2)
2 + l2 (n+ 1)
: (9)
4 The horizontal merger: private incentives
We now consider a horizontal merger amongm 2 [2; n  1] co-ops. Given the
nature of a workersco-op, it seems reasonable to assume that the member-
ship of the rm resulting from the merger is the sum of ex ante memberships
of the merging rms, with the adjustment taking place along the capital di-
mension only.10 That is to say, the total number of workers/members in the
new rm resulting from the merger will be ml. As a result of the merger,
we will observe n  m + 1 independent rms acting on the market. Hence,
one has to compute the FOCs for the company resulting from the merger
(labelled M) and the n m outsiders, to be taken on the following objective
functions, respectively:
VM =

a mlpkM   l
Pn m
j=1
p
kj

ml
p
kM   kM
ml
(10)
Vi =

a mlpkM   l
p
ki   l
Pn m 1
j=1
p
kj

l
p
ki   ki
l
(11)
Therefore, the relevant FOCs are:
@VM
@kM
=
ml

a+ l
Pn m
j=1
p
kj

  2 (1 + l2m2)pkM
2l
p
kM
= 0 (12)
10Many empirical papers surveyed by Perotin (2012) conrm that workersco-ops tend
to stabilise employment in the short-run reaction to shocks.
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@Vi
@ki
=
l
h
a  l

m
p
kM +
Pn m 1
j=1
p
kj
i
  2 (1 + l2)pki
2l
p
ki
= 0 (13)
Now, imposing the symmetry condition ki = kj = kout across the population
of outsiders (denoted by the subscript out), we can solve the above system
of FOCs w.r.t. kM and kout :
kNM =
a2l2m2 (2 + l2)
2
[4 + l4m2 (2 + n m) + 2l2 (n+ 1 +m (2m  1))]2 (14)
kNout =
a2l2 (2 + l2m2)
2
[4 + l4m2 (2 + n m) + 2l2 (n+ 1 +m (2m  1))]2 (15)
From a straightforward comparison between kNout, k
N
M and k
N (n), we can
claim:
Remark 1 For any merger of size m 2 [2; n  1]: kNM < mkN (n) ; while
kNout > k
N (n); and kNM < k
N
out.
Hence, the post-merger capital adjustment operates in opposite directions
for insiders and outsiders. While the former contract their capital w.r.t. the
pre-merger Nash equilibrium, the latter expand it. As a result, the new
company invests less than each of the n m outsiders.
Given the ex post distribution of memberships, we look now at the con-
sequences in terms of equilibrium price and industry output:
Proposition 2 Any merger of size m 2 [2; n  1] brings about an increase
in price (and a reduction in industry output).
Proof. The ex post equilibrium price is
pNM =
a (2 + l2) (2 + l2m2)
4 + l4m2 (2 + n m) + 2l2 (n+ 1 +m (2m  1)) (16)
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Comparing (16) and (9), we have
pNM pN (n) =
al2 (2 + l2) (m  1)m (l2m  2)
[2 + l2 (n+ 1)] [4 + l4m2 (2 + n m) + 2l2 (n+ 1 +m (2m  1))]
(17)
which is positive everywhere. Therefore, QNM < Q
N (n) :
We may disentangle the driving forces behind the increase in price by
looking at the consequences of merger on individual output levels:
Remark 3 The merging rms contract their output w.r.t. the pre-merger
levels (i.e., qNM < mq
N (n)) while the opposite occurs to all outsiders (i.e.,
qNout > q
N (n)).
The nal e¤ect on price shows that the contraction in the output of the
merging rms outweighs the expansion on the part of the outsiders.
These e¤ects of the merger on output levels and price, in turn, are the
consequence of the variations in the amounts of capital caused by the merger,
as summarised in Remark 1 above.
We are now ready to tackle the key question of the private incentives to
merge. The ex post level of value added per worker/member is:
V NM =
a2lm2 (2 + l2)
2
(1 + l2m2)
[4 + l4m2 (2 + n m) + 2l2 (n+ 1 +m (2m  1))]2 (18)
for the rm generated by the merger, and
V Nout =
a2l (1 + l2) (2 + l2m2)
2
[4 + l4m2 (2 + n m) + 2l2 (n+ 1 +m (2m  1))]2 (19)
for any of the n m outsiders.
To establish the existence of a private incentive to carry out the merger,
we need to compare V NM with V
N (n). I¤ V NM > V
N (n) ; any of the ml
workers/members would vote in favour of the merger. We are about to show
that this is always the case.
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Proposition 4 V NM > V
N (n) for all m 2 [2; n  1] :
Proof. The sign of V NM   V N (n) is the sign of:
16 (m+ 1) + l10m4 (3 + 2n m)+ (20)
4l4 [5 +m (2m (2m+ 5)  1)] + 6n+ 4nm [m (m+ 1) + 1] + n2 (m+ 1)+
16l2 [2 + n+m (m (m+ 1) + n+ 1)]+
4l6

2m4 + (n+ 1)2 +m2 (n+ 2) (n+ 4) +m
 
n2   1+m3 (n (n+ 4)  1)+
l8m2

7 m (5 +m (m  11)) + 10n+ 2nm (m+ 1) + 3n2 (m+ 1)
The expressions appearing in the ve lines of (20) are all positive because
n > m. Hence, V NM > V
N (n).
Concerning outsiders, the consequences of the merger are summarised by
the following:
Proposition 5 For all m 2 [2; n  1] ; the horizontal merger increases the
outsiderspayo¤s.
Proof. It su¢ ces to note that
sign

V Nout   V N (n)
	
= (21)
sign

8 + l2

4 (n+ 1) +m
 
m
 
6 + l2 (2n+ 3 m)  2	
with the expression on the r.h.s. being positive for all m 2 [2; n  1] :
Therefore, the merger always exerts a positive spillover on outsiders.
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5 Welfare analysis
We now assess the welfare consequences of the horizontal merger. As is
common practice in partial equilibrium analysis, social welfare is dened by
the sum of consumer and producer surplus. In our setting, however, it would
be inappropriate to identify producer surplus with prots, as the ultimate
goal of rms is value added per worker. Hence, we use total revenue net of
the industry amount of capital as a measure of producer surplus:
PS = pQ  nk (22)
To understand why this is the appropriate measure of the surplus accruing
to rms, notice that we should multiply the level of the value added per
worker/member by the total number of workers/members in the industry:
PS = nl

pq   k
l

(23)
which yields precisely (22). As for the consumer surplus, dened as usual by
the area below the demand function and above the market price, it is given
by CS = Q2=2.
Then, in the pre-merger equilibrium, social welfare is
SWN (n) = PSN (n) + CSN (n) =
a2l2n [2 + l2 (n+ 2)]
2 [2 + l2 (n+ 1)]2
(24)
The full expression of the post-merger social welfare is given by the sum
of gross total revenue and consumer surplus minus total capital expenditure:
SWNM = p
N
M
 
a  pNM

+ CSNM   kNM   (n m) kNout (25)
where
CSNM =
 
a  pNM
2
2
= (26)
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a4l4 [4n+m (m (4 (1 + l2 (n m+ 1)) + l4 (1 +m2 (n m)))  4)]2
2 [4 + l4m2 (n m+ 2) + 2l2 (n+ 1 +m (2m  1))]4
The social (in)e¢ ciency of the horizontal merger has to be evaluated
through of the sign of
SW  SWNM   SWN (n) (27)
The examination of (27) leads to the following result:
Proposition 6 SW > 0 for all a > max f0; a+g :
Proof. SW may be written as a quadratic function of a :
SW (a) =  (l;m; n) a2 +  (l;m; n) a+  (l;m; n) (28)
where  () ;  () and  () are polynomials. Our result rests on the analysis
of  () :
 (l;m; n) = l2

2 + l2 (n+ 1)
2
[4n+m	]2 (29)
	   m  4  1 + l2 (n m+ 1)+ l4  1 +m2 (n m)  4
which is always positive. Consequently, we envisage four possible (and mu-
tually exclusive) scenarios:
i) The two solutions of SW (a) = 0 w.r.t. a are both negative. In this
case, the merger is socially e¢ cient for all a > 0.
ii) SW (a) = 0 has no real solutions. In this case, the same conclusion
as in case (i) applies.
iii) SW (a) = 0 has two real solutions of opposite sign, a  < 0 < a+.
In this case, SW (a) > 0 for all a > a+.
iv) SW (a) = 0 has two real solutions, both positive: 0 < a  < a+.
Here, the merger is surely socially e¢ cient for all a > a+.11
11The overlong expressions of  () ;  () and  () ; as well as a are available upon
request from the authors.
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6 The prot-seeking industry
So far, we have focussed on workersco-operatives because the assumption
of the stability in employment best ts this type of rms. However, the same
behavior can originate also from a prot-seeking rm subject to constraints
on the number of employees. This might be the case with publicly-owned
enterprises (e.g., several utilities in Europe) as well as with privately-owned
rms operating in strongly unionised industries.
It can be easily shown that, when the amount of labour is xed, the
maximisation of value added per worker amounts to maximising prots. To
see this, observe that since
Vi =
pqi   ki
l
(30)
and prots are
i = pqi   wl   ki; (31)
where w is the unit wage; then
Vi =
i
l
+ w (32)
which in turn also implies that Vi > w; otherwise the members of the coop-
erative would quit it to o¤er their labor elsewhere. Clearly, given l and w,
the value of ki maximising i coincides with the level which maximises value
added per worker/member. Consequently, the private and social incentives
towards the merger are identical under the two rmsmaximands.
For our model applies to horizontal mergers among prot-seekers too, the
foregoing analysis may shed some light also on the debate about the merger
paradox mentioned in the introduction. In such a debate, the focus was on
the consequences of a merger under di¤erent assumptions about the nature
of returns in production, the latter being summarised by the properties of
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costs as a function of output.12 A classical example emerging from such a
debate involves the lack of a prot incentive to carry out a merger between
two rms out of three enterprises in the industry. An elementary exercise
consisting in setting n = 3 and m = 2 in (20) su¢ ces to detect that in our
setup such a merger is e¢ cient for the merging rms irrespective of whether
they aim at maximising prot or individual value added, as the incentive to
merge reduces to
V NM (2)  V N (3) =
a2l [3 + l2 (25 + 72l2 + 91l4 + 45l6 + 7l8)]
4 [1 + l2 (7 + 13l2 + 6l4)]2
(33)
which is strictly positive, and therefore also NM (2) > 
N (3). The sign of
(33) is clearly a straightforwad consequence of our Proposition 4. the lesson
we may draw from (33) is that, if one models technology through a well-
behaved production function instead of a cost function, under the constraint
of a constant employment level, the standard textbook example of the merger
paradox does not hold anymore.13
7 E¢ ciency e¤ect and merger to monopoly
Through the initial assumption m 2 [2; n  1] ; we have ruled out, so far, the
merger to monopoly. Yet, as the per-rm (and therefore industry) employ-
ment is bound to be constant, the following can be easily established:
Proposition 7 There exists a market size ea above which the merger to
monopoly is socially e¢ cient.
12The debate, inaugurated by Salant et al. (1983), include Perry and Porter (1985) and
Farrell and Shapiro (1990), among others.
13Such example, borrowed from Salant et al. (1983), shows, indeed, that in a triopoly,
the only protable merger is the one to monopoly.
15
We omit the explicit expression of ea, which can be easily computed by
posing m = n and solving SW = 0 w.r.t. a, and indeed corresponds to a+
in m = n. The rationale behind this result can be explained relying upon
the e¢ ciency e¤ect generated by the reduction of capital equipment. For
the merger succeeds in shrinking the overall amount of capital by reducing
the duplication of plants, this e¤ect can more than compensate the extreme
reduction in consumer surplus generated by monopoly pricing.
This conclusion has a denite Schumpeterian avour. In fact, the post-
merger contraction in the level of capital corresponds to a leftward move-
ment along the production function (where capital is the only variable in-
put). Given the properties of our production function, the new point along
it is associated to a higher marginal productivity of capital w.r.t. the pre-
merger situation. Hence, we may think of this adjustment as equivalent to
the outcome of capital-saving R&D activity undertaken by the monopolist
resulting from the merger. The e¢ ciency e¤ect that we have just envisaged
strengthens the argument put forward by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) when
discussing the e¢ ciency defence associated with restructuring of plants (and
therefore abating xed costs). Moreover, our horizontal merger squarely ts
the category of benecial concentrations in the sense of Daughety (1990).
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the horizontal merger, for any merger
size, is: (i) privately e¢ cient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially
e¢ cient if market size is large enough. Moreover, also merging to monopoly
can be socially desirable. We have focussed on workerscooperatives, but
our results apply also to employment-constrained prot-seeking rms.
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It is worth noting that our model encompasses the frequently observed
case of mixed oligopoly, e.g. industries in which prot-seeking rms coexist
with workersco-ops. As long as they are both constrained on the employ-
ment side, although for di¤erent reasons, our results fully extend to such a
mixed industry, and therefore the incentives to merge that we have outlined
above would hold for a merger among prot-seekers and workersco-ops.
A promising line of research would likely consist in explicitly modelling
the dynamics of capital adjustment in a di¤erential game, possibly accounting
for the dynamics of the business cycle as well. Such a model might succeed
in explaining the empirical observation of waves of horizontal mergers among
workersco-ops during slums.
17
References
[1] Daughety, A. (1990), Benecial Concentration, American Economic
Review, 80, 1231-37.
[2] Delbono, F. and C. Reggiani (2013), Cooperative rms and the crisis:
evidence from some Italian mixed oligopolies, Annals of Public and
Cooperative Economics, 84, 383-97.
[3] Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1990), Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium
Analysis, American Economic Review, 80, 107-26.
[4] Meliá, E., J.F. Juliá and A. Martinez (2010), Mergers of Agrifood Co-
operatives and Their E¤ects: From Expectations to Results. An Empir-
ical Study in Four Spanish Autonomous Regions, Spanish Journal of
Agricultural Research, 8, 235-50.
[5] Perotin, V. (2012), The Performance of Workers Cooperatives, in Bat-
tilani, P., Schroter, H. (eds), The Cooperative Business Movement, 1950
to the Present, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[6] Perry, M. and R. Porter (1985), Oligopoly and the Incentive for Hori-
zontal Merger, American Economic Review, 75, 219-27.
[7] Salant, S., S. Switzer and R. Reynolds (1983), Losses from Horizontal
Merger: The E¤ects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 185-
213.
[8] Sertel, M. (1987), WorkersEnterprises Are Not Perverse, European
Economic Review, 31, 1619-25.
18
[9] Ward, B. (1958), The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism, American
Economic Review, 48, 566-89.
[10] Zanotti, A. (2012), The Strength of an Intersectorial Network, in Zevi,
A. et al. (eds), Beyond the Crisis: Cooperatives, Work, Finance, Cecop,
Brussels.
19
 
